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ON THE PRESENT SITUATION, FINANCIAL AND  
POLITICAL, OF THE KINGDOM OF PORTUGAL.

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# TO-DAY.

BY

J. G. DE BARROS E CUNHA.


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LONDON:

W. H. COLLINGRIDGE, 117 to 120, ALDERSGATE STREET, E.C.

1868.

*Price Sixpence.*



*J. J. O'Keefe*

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*The - President*

*The Minister of England*

TO-DAY.

*from the part of*

*the author.*

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BY

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## PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION.

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THIS little work was first published in Lisbon, under the title of "Hoje," on the 17th August last, and within a fortnight after its appearance no less than 20,000 copies were sold. Such a reception seems to justify its author in the belief that a translation may be interesting to a class, however limited, of English readers, who will be entitled to regard it as a real expression of the national mind in Portugal, of which chance has chosen him as the interpreter. The prosperity and independence of Portugal, he ventures to suggest, are a subject of more than local interest. Throughout Europe there is in progress a silent contest between two forces; the one tending towards autocratic governments and ultramontaniam, the other towards constitutional governments and religious toleration. To no country can this contest be a matter of indifference. Portugal, like England, has long been, and still is, on the side of civil and religious liberty. Treaties, extending over more than two centuries, and the invincible lines of Torres Vedras, still exist to show how England has valued her alliance with Portugal, and has known how to turn it to account in times of European trouble.

The reader will bear in mind that the original of the pamphlet he has now in hand was published before the outbreak of the still recent revolution in Spain; an event which might have seemed to promise a better understanding on the



part of the two nations occupying the Peninsula, During the Bourbon dynasty nothing could exist between them except moral, if not material, antagonism; and if the Spanish press is any criterion, how can we doubt but that the same aggressive spirit still survives, when the people of Portugal are called upon to read such language as this: "Just as Italy is incomplete without Rome, so is Spain incomplete without Portugal. Italy began her great work sooner than Spain, but perhaps Spain will arrive first at the conclusion"? In truth, the plans and the prospects of Spain are known to nobody; they can only be surmised as events go on. But this is certain, that a people may upset a dynasty, and launch into existence a new constitution, without effecting any change in its own deep-seated character. Herein lies the difference between the Spaniard and the Portuguese; herein lies the reason why a fusion of the two countries would probably endanger the liberal cause at present firmly established in Portugal, while it would almost certainly fail to secure it by the experiment of an United Iberia.

NOTE.—The whole of the translator's performance has been examined by Senhor J. G. de Barros e Cunha, and has received his sanction.



# T O - D A Y.

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"VENIT NOX QUANDO NEMO POTEST OPERARI."

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## I.

Not now, not in the hour that sees Portugal at last awaken from her long and careless slumber, can it avail to pursue the political retrospections, the old recriminations and personal discussions, in which we have so fruitlessly passed the calm period of freedom that we have enjoyed amid European agitations. The moment is serious, far too serious, for aught that bears not directly upon our future.

I do not believe that there have been any ministries since 1851 that have not aimed at doing all the good in their power to the nation.

Some brought into practice the maxim of political toleration.

Others introduced railroads, and developed enormously the means of communication within the country.

Others broke the last links of the old feudal fetters which yet enchained the land, and which had escaped, much against the Emperor's (A) will, the daring hand of Monzinho da Silveira (B).

If the people have not known how to profit by their franchises and political rights; if the great improvements in our system of internal communication have cost us too dear; if no perceptible results have yet followed disinfestation, this is not the fault of the enlightened minds which conceived those reforms and enterprises, contended for them, and carried them into execution.

The people have not cared to make use of their political liberties except with an eye to local advantages, or when influenced by the solicitations of ignorant agitators.

The cost of the railways, in which should be comprehended bad workmanship and ill-chosen plans, however great it may be, is not greater than all other countries have had to pay as the price of their apprenticeship; a price which governments as well as individuals always do pay to speculators and charlatans.

From the inexperience of the people in employing and turning to account their rights of political investigation and action, from the inexperience of government in the construction of roads and railways, proceeds the condition in which we now find ourselves, and the largeness of the debt that weighs upon us; and though perhaps future results may prove that we have not paid over-dearly for our lesson, yet it is certain that hitherto we have only been preyed upon by unprincipled demagogues and unscrupulous contractors, who have been playing into each other's hands in a way that seems incredible.

Statesmen of both parties have uttered their financial dogmas under the false notion that the State has resources in itself, other than those

furnished by each citizen through the channel of taxation.

Thence sprang the school that took for its device, "The people can pay, and ought to pay, more." In opposition to this, another school immediately arose with the motto, "The people might pay, and ought to pay, less."

The first of these schools was arbitrary and audacious; the second timid and irresolute.

While lavishly distributing roads and bridges with a view to local influences, and so as to acquire for the supporters of their policy the venal popularity of provincial towns and hamlets, the different governments still kept adjourning the votes of supply equivalent to the cost of these local improvements, for fear of displeasing the idols they themselves had created, and also in order to preserve the prestige of the political pretorians who sustained the Ministerial cause in the electoral colleges.

Disinclined to endanger their popularity by imposing taxes, and not taking courage to speak the truth to the country, they had recourse to borrowing on credit.

As it was the State that was contracting loans, as it was the State that would have to pay them, nobody troubled himself about the matter.

The loans, however, followed one after another, until at present we have to pay, besides the inscribed charge which they brought upon us (and which is the price of the many improvements we possess), the charge in addition of a floating debt to which recourse has been had to meet the current expenses.

By this convenient, easy, and popular process, we have contrived to raise the interest of the public debt

to eight thousand contos of reis (about £1,750,000), equal to more than half the income of the State; and we have accomplished a deficit which, according to the best calculations, will this year amount to seven thousand contos of reis (about £1,550,000).

Let not the nation delude itself. These seven thousand contos of reis cannot be found in the promised economies. They must be met by means of taxation. They *must* be met, because the national honour demands it.

Economy there may be, but economy of itself will not suffice. There may be important economies, but they will not stop the growth of the deficit; and every year which passes without effectuating them adds to the deficit the interest corresponding to the new amount of floating debt whence the means are sought to balance the difference between what the people pay and what the same people spend.

The unanimous voice of the nation calling for economies is just; but the promise of saving the finances by their result is fallacious, ignorant, senseless.

It was the difficulty of this financial situation that suspended during several days the formation of the Cabinet which came into power in place of that of the 4th of January. It was the precarious state of the public treasury that incited the aspirations of Spain, and those home intrigues which see in the agony of our country the opportunity for realising the old scheme of forming an united Iberia.

It has ever been the practice of this country and this people, rocked in the cradle of the great glories of the past, to smile with disdain at every menace of Spanish conquest or dominion.

There is no conceivable hypothesis that can disconcert the vain-glory of these fire-eaters on the subject of national independence.

Some quote Camoens, others Aljubarrota and the wooden Shovel (c), others Montes-Claros (d), others the popular ballads, in which one Portuguese is always equal to ten Spaniards.

Ridiculous bravados, only suited to the silly vanity and presumption of a degenerate and unthinking people!

One is reminded of the capture of Pekin when one listens to such boasters, who, if they were left to themselves, would probably behave like the mandarins of the Celestial Empire, when they placed painted lions before the enemy: they would form their lines of defence with stanzas from the "Lusiad" in capital letters, with engravings from the edition of the Morgado Mattheus, and the rusty old sword of D. João I. It is true that in Lisbon, as in Pekin, the invasion would be announced by the arrival of the invaders; but then the tranquillity of the country would not have been disturbed up to the last moment, nor the national susceptibility pained by the faintest doubt of ancestral glories and traditions.

I confess I would give more for rifled cannon than for all the future Knights of Aviz (e), when it comes to the defence of our frontiers; I would rather have one squadron of cavalry mounted on good horses than two shovels of Aljubarrota, even if it were possible to resuscitate Anna Brites; and I suspect that needle guns would be found to be more convincing than the strophes of Camoens himself.

But on this, as on some other subjects, I have the misfortune to differ from many statesmen of this

country, from the whole of the middle class, and the majority of the people.

Modern history tells me what conceited and self-confident patriotism was worth, when Portuguese Royalty, while yet in the national waters, saw our own cannon pointed by French hands against the stern of the vessel that bore, humiliated and covered with shame, the crown of D. Alfonso Henriques (F).

History tells me again in what fashion the national pride and point of honour were vindicated when, but a few years ago, under the very windows of our public offices, and directly in front of the statue of D. José I., the eagles of France were allowed to swoop down upon a slave-ship reclaimed by the Imperial Government, after having been condemned in the name of civilisation and humanity by a Portuguese tribunal (G).

I regret that my adherence to history obliges me to be altogether at variance with the enthusiasm and confidence of my fellow-countrymen; but this is no hour for the flattering of vanity.

The Spanish press has been treating of the manner in which the invasion and conquest of Portugal might be achieved. The plan published in the Spanish journals, and thence copied into the Portuguese journals, is so familiar to the public that I need not do more than refer to it.

The shock of surprise which this plan gave to the whole country is but the repetition of what has invariably occurred in all our contentions with Spain.

Yet we ought to have considered ourselves warned, after the declarations made by the Conde de Lavradio, in the Chamber of Peers, and by the Visconde de



Soveral, in a published letter—that within the supreme laboratories of European politics the absorption of our nationality was actually under consideration.

The Visconde de Soveral inquired, openly and distinctly, of Sr. Casal Ribeiro, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, if he had been relieved of the duties of Envoy to the Court of Madrid on account of his refusal to become the docile instrument of a policy intended to erase the name of Portugal from the list of nations.

This ought to have been enough to cause Parliament to occupy itself with the subject,—to cause the press to take it in hand until it had been thoroughly sifted,—to cause the whole country not to rest a single night, lest the morning should find it with its wrists manacled and its nationality lost.

But no one would take notice.

And now we wonder to see the storm over our heads.

The opposite party, well knowing the indolent and credulous spirit of the populace, is employing religious fanaticism to spread dissension in neighbourhoods and in families; is counselling resistance to all authority, disobedience to the laws of the kingdom; and, while diplomacy is assisting at the secrets of the plot which designs to destroy us, by striking at the heart of our national being, the bigotry of some, and the insane levity of others, by demoralising the people, undermine and shake the very foundations of the realm.

## II.

I think it has been fully shown that there exists a powerful conspiracy, engaged in darkness, in weaving for us the fate which has overtaken so many small nationalities within the last few years.



Those who contribute most of all to strengthen this intrigue are ourselves.

Everything that can condemn a people to be subject to guardianship and tutelage converges against us.

We are prodigal.

We are presumptuous and disorderly.

We are negligent in the defence of our frontiers.

We are incapable of benefiting by the great freedom we enjoy.

We are reactionary and fanatical; for, in direct opposition to the laws, we permit and encourage the re-establishment of monastic orders.

We have a strong neighbour who has need of us, in order to become a power of the first rank, and for whom we are a Naboth's vineyard.

And, worse by far, we have, among our own brothers, among the sons of this country, active agents who invite the foreigner to his spoil.

We have an annual deficit equal to half of our income.

We have a public debt, which swallows more than half of that income.

We have had a refusal on the part of the people to pay taxes.

And we have a parcel of men, bereft of reason, rousing and inflaming the most dangerous passions, for the purpose of turning them to their own account.

We have no fortifications.

No artillery.

No cavalry that can charge.

No infantry that can march.

No arms made upon modern principles.

No soldiers that know how to use the arms they have.

No national militia.

No navy.

No colonies.

No allies.

I know beforehand that I shall be accused of indiscretion and haste by the very men who, in the press and in Parliament, in meetings and in public places, have written and spoken, bit by bit, exactly what I have here said all at once.

The things that they themselves, professedly the competent and acknowledged authorities, have uttered and printed are in existence for their own use and inspection. Let us do justice to Europe, in supposing that it neither hears nor reads them.

To deny or to conceal facts which are to be found in the official registers, and which are within the reach of everybody, merely to keep the country in ignorance of that which it is of the utmost importance it should know, would be to act like the doctor who prolongs the malady to make a fortune by his patient.

The crisis is grave. It is not alone a financial or an economical crisis ; it is a national crisis.

To surmount it is difficult, very difficult ; but it is not impossible.

It is the people, ever deceived, yet ever ready to redeem, by the sacrifice of their little all, the financial mal-administration of the classes which ought to know better, and to retrieve with their blood the negligence or the crimes of those put over them ;—it is the people, I say, who must take the first step, which is to resume the authority conferred upon them by the fundamental law of the State, and to exercise it for the benefit of their country and of themselves, instead of resigning it at the feet of administrations

without ideas, of perverse factions, or to the call of the miserable interests of individuals.

### III.

The defence of Portugal, since we can now no longer doubt its necessity, must obviously proceed side by side with the reorganization of our finances and administration. I would first say a few words on the condition of our armaments.

Although, since the surveys made in 1810, highways and railroads have introduced a new element into the movement of the troops that would have to defend Portugal, and new facilities for their concentration, yet, in all that bears upon the physical structure of the kingdom, it is certain that the general plan then arrived at cannot be greatly modified now.

Then, as now, the Alemtejo was considered to be the weakest part of our line of defence; and the railway, which ought to have passed between Fort de Graça and Elvas, does not pass there. On the contrary, the station is at the distance of three kilomètres from Elvas; and Fort de Graça can only bring to bear upon the line an oblique and very uncertain fire.

Even if the works of engineering art were more expensive than they are, this part of the line ought never to have been allowed exemption from all the rules and requirements of defence necessary for the safety of the kingdom.

Where we were careless, the Spaniards were well-advised and cautious.

As though to give us a lesson, they made their railway between the frontier and the Guadiana follow

the left bank of the river, and describe two curves in inverse directions, in order to pass between the fort of San Christobal and the opposite redoubt. In this manner, not only does the line lie between two fires, but, on leaving the station, it would be completely swept for a distance of four kilomètres by the artillery of the fort.

“All this shows how much afraid the Spaniards are of us!” will be the comment of the redoubtable gentlemen who go about puffing patriotism.

Our improvidence left the eastern railway, right up to our capital, open to Spain, who, with the means that she possesses of concentrating important forces upon Almeida on one side, and upon Elvas on the other, is in a position to threaten, at the same moment, Lisbon and Oporto, the two cities the occupation of which would decide the fate of the country.

Some authorities have judged it sufficient to fortify Lisbon and Oporto, leaving the frontiers open. Others maintain that the line of fortifications between Evora and Portalegre ought to be completed, Almeida restored, and the ground disputed inch by inch up to the lines of Torres Vedras.

Neither of these plans can be carried out with a hundred contos of reis (£22,200). Either all that is passing before our eyes is a dream, or the hundred contos asked by Government for the fortifications are meant to assure us that no fortifications are wanted.

As for the organisation of the army, arguments would be superfluous. The influence that superior weapons and more skilled tactics have on the international affairs of Europe has been demonstrated by facts in the Danish question, and in the simplification of the political geography of Germany.

What Chassepôt rifles can do against the most tried and the most heroic patriotism France taught all of us at Mentana. For where Garibaldi's volunteers lost, no volunteers on earth could win.

It is the army that will have to shed the first blood ; *that* will be offered as the first sacrifice to the dignity and independence of our country. It must be armed, organised, equipped, and instructed, in order to possess that confidence in itself which is the earliest and most efficacious step towards victory.

To arm volunteers, as England did, teach and discipline them ; establish prizes for the best rifle-shooting ; prepare the nation at large to defend its property, liberty, and life ; — all this ought to be done, but done on a well-considered system, possible and practicable, that the sacrifices called for may not be more burdensome than can be helped, and besides burdensome, useless.

All this is only to be done by money.

All this is only to be done by taxation ; for retrenchments, however great, cannot possibly furnish the amount needed.

Some have said that our existence as a nation depends upon the arbitrary will of the great powers. This is an error.

The great powers cannot be every day setting in movement their fleets and armies, to take part in contentions that for them have no interest. This reasonable policy decided England to adopt with regard to the domestic questions of the Continent the principle of non-intervention.

Thus did Italy and Germany clip the power of the Apostolic Empire, and arrange their frontiers with France. But the case of Portugal is different. Por-

tugal now is not only an important basis of military operations in the event of a Continental war ; she is a country wherein reign the freest institutions, and the most practically liberal and thoroughly tolerant government. She is the bulwark of Europe's freedom in the Peninsula.

Whatever may have been the mistakes and shortcomings of our men, no one can deny that the Portuguese race is, by virtue of its institutions, the natural ally of all free nations.

The fanatical policy of Spain, and the unfortunately wavering policy of the French Empire, have pretended to describe and decry us as being a colony of England. This assertion also is the reverse of truth.

We are less of an English colony than Spain, who, with all her arrogance, consents to bear in Gibraltar (Spanish ground) a brand of vassalage and humiliation.

Portugal is linked to England by those commercial relations which naturally foster amity between countries whose different geographical positions make them the producers of dissimilar merchandise.

Now, what does Spain want ?

To break off our trade with Great Britain ?

Of course that would be an excellent thing for her, because she would get rid of her most powerful competitor in the agricultural industry of her southern provinces, and would secure a resigned customer for her manufactures.

But Spain does not seriously advance that argument. She cannot altogether ignore statistics.

The following is the account of our dealings with perfidious Albion during the past year, 1867 :—



1867

## EXPORTATION FROM PORTUGAL TO ENGLAND.

Description of Merchandise.		Declared Real Value.	
		In Reis.	In £ Sterling.
Continent of the Kingdom.	Wine .....	4,248,000 \$ 000	944,000
	Iron and Copper Pyrites	2,209,500 \$ 000	491,000
	Corks :.....	936,000 \$ 000	208,000
	Oil and Oil-Seeds .....	567,000 \$ 000	126,000
	Oranges and Lemons....	445,500 \$ 000	99,000
	Animals .....	504,000 \$ 000	112,000
	Onions .....	153,000 \$ 000	34,000
	Various .....	2,263,500 \$ 000	503,000
Islands.		11,326,500 \$ 000	2,517,000
	Azores .....	1,656,000 \$ 000	368,000
	Madeira .....	144,000 \$ 000	32,000
	Cape Verde .....	—	—
Total.....		13,126,500 \$ 000	2,917,000

Exportation in excess on the side of



1867

## IMPORTATION FROM ENGLAND TO PORTUGAL.

Description of Merchandise.		Declared Real Value.	
		In Reis.	In £ Sterling.
Continent of the Kingdom.	Cotton Piece Goods ....	4,680,000 \$ 000	1,040,000
	Iron .....	675,000 \$ 000	150,000
	Woollen Piece Goods....	630,000 \$ 000	140,000
	Butter .....	562,000 \$ 000	125,000
	Coals .....	360,000 \$ 000	80,000
	Linen Piece Goods.....	225,000 \$ 000	50,000
	Foreign and Colonial....	1,665,000 \$ 000	370,000
	Various .....	1,867,500 \$ 000	415,000
Islands.		10,664,500 \$ 000	2,370,000
	Azores .....	622,000 \$ 000	138,000
	Madeira .....	400,500 \$ 000	89,000
	Cape Verde.....	157,500 \$ 000	35,000
	Total.....	11,844,500 \$ 000	2,632,000

Portugal, Reis, 1,282,000 \$ 000 = £285,000.

Our dependence upon England consists, then, in her buying the greater part of our produce; and in this way Spain, too, is her dependent, and so is France: nay, if the mere fact of mutually exchanging commodities is to constitute us a colony of England, what is France, who has made a special treaty with her for that purpose?

What does Spain offer Portugal that should tempt us to accept the much-talked-of Iberian Union?

She would snatch Portugal from the claws of the British Lion.

Let her sweep her own house first; and when the last Englishman has left Gibraltar, we will listen to her lessons on the subject of national dignity.

Does she offer us her constitution?

Is there in the whole world a more barbarous rule than that to which Spain is subjected? and can the constitution which permits it be compared to ours?

Or peace and security in our homes?

Security, which means banishment without a trial; means the virulence and ferocity of a persecution that spares neither private virtue nor public services, neither rank, nor sex, nor age.

Can she give us a dynasty and a court more respected or more respectable than our own?

If so, why can she not suppress the irritation and discontent of her people? Why is her government flung from sword to sword, till the sceptre of her Queen becomes the plaything of the barracks?

Or will she bring us her credit, to raise the European market for the bonds of our national debt?

What is the price, and what the credit of the Spanish funds?

Or will she introduce among us her system of taxation, to extinguish our deficit?

Can there be any taxes more onerous, worse distributed, levied in a more oppressive manner, than those of Spain? Is there any nation that pays a heavier tribute, or where the fiscal exactions are more vexatious, and the expectations of civilized life less consulted?

Spain possesses politically nothing that can invite a people orderly like ours, with the guarantees of our laws, and the tolerance of our manners, to make common cause with her.

Spain suffers from the same evils that we do, only in a far more aggravated form; because that which with us is but an element of disorder, an obstacle and interruption to the progressive course of administration, is with her the normal and recognised system of government.

But Spain does possess the brute force which has been found requisite to prop a tottering throne, and to annihilate civil, political, and religious liberty.

And it is this force which she proposes to send across our frontier, to rescue us from the tutelage and predominance of Great Britain.

Very well. Then against force, force.

Let us organise ourselves, and it will not be a Spanish army that will come here with impunity to conquer us. But the whole nation must look to itself, and that at once, if it cares to remain free and independent.

The policy of Spain is the policy of France, because the Imperial Government has it very close at heart to prevent the dominion of democracy, and

also to prevent that of the Orleans family. Neither would be at all convenient to the existing dynasty.

Is it not, perhaps, the Imperial Government that inspires and animates Spain, when Spain comes forward to save us from England?

Was it England who, failing in the respect due to our tribunals, came into the Tagus to insult us, and impose upon us a war contribution to compensate her slave-traders?

Was it England who, a little while ago, according to the declaration made by Senhor Canto, late Minister of Public Works, interfered to support the demands of a railway company?

No! England does not do these things, because in England public opinion reigns, and not a personal government.

And it is that public opinion which is the true ally of Portugal, because it is the ally of all freedom, and the enemy of every tyranny.

England will be with us if we know how seriously to accept our mission, if we are capable of comprehending the part reserved to us, and if we can prove ourselves worthy of the consideration and respect of Europe. She will only abandon us when, like Poland, we show ourselves incapable of directing our own destinies.

The rumours that Portugal is destined to be torn in pieces, like the deer hunted in the forest, by England herself have been set afloat for the purpose of sapping the nation's energy, by taking away all hope of any help.

These rumours are unfounded, and it is much to be regretted that our ministers lately have not

followed the example of the Duke of Loulé, who, in 1861, when the *Siècle* was employing the pen of its editor, M. Léon Plée, on the Iberian union and the dismemberment of Portugal, caused it to be answered in our ministerial paper, and put an end to the discussion.

It is not impossible that, had certain questions which have recently been discussed in the foreign press been met in the same manner, Portugal would not now be finding so much indifference, both abroad and at home; but, instead of combating such insidious manœuvres, our statesmen and diplomatists alike seem to pride themselves upon helping to distress and disconcert the public mind.

The organisation of our finances is the other point to be considered in the situation of our country.

The great Turenne pronounced that for making war three things were necessary—

First. Money.

Secondly. Money.

Thirdly. Money.

Upon that occasion the Marshal was speaking of offensive warfare; and his dictum has, it is true, its comforting side, when we look at the state of the Spanish treasury. But then, neither can a war of defence be carried on for nothing.

Organising the finances includes simplifying the public service without compromising its efficiency, reforming the civil administration, developing every sort of progress that may contribute to make the industries of the country improve and prosper.

On finance, as on administration, there are two theories of political economists for us to consult.

In finance, one will recommend direct, the other indirect taxation.

In civil administration, one will be for centralising everything, the other for making dependent upon the State only so much as must necessarily be directed and modified by the laws which apply equally to the whole country.

Administrative decentralisation is calculated to produce, along with a healthy sense of responsibility, energy and self-reliance in the different localities ; constitutional life throughout the kingdom ; fairness in the assessment of the taxes ; simplification of much of the public service now dependent upon the Home Office ; economy for all—for the individual and for the State.

Municipalities that desire to retain their charters must provide for all the local expenditure.

They must pay the schoolmasters, the magistrates, and the clergy ; and they must make the roads, not for the profit and convenience of presidents of municipal boards, but in harmony with the general requirements of traffic.

The municipality ought, then, to enjoy, throughout its own jurisdiction, and in conformity with the common laws, full and complete freedom of action, while full and complete responsibility should likewise be required of it.

If, built upon this basis, the administrative reform, which the country claims as a vital necessity, does not produce the most advantageous results, why then the distance that separates us from Spain is not so great as I supposed.

I cannot quit this subject without saying a few



words on a power which has been, in great part, the cause of the insane agitations that have lately disturbed the public peace; a power which tends more than anything else to do away with all proper respect for authority. It is the power of the bureaucracy. Always greedy to get put into well-paid and easy places, certain public officers, who ought to be giving their services in return for their salaries, only busy themselves in thwarting the Government, and setting the very immoral example of insulting, when they cannot control, the authorities of the State.

And yet it appears that no Cabinet hitherto has been able to govern without the support of the representatives of this power.

It is upon these people that the pruning-knife of retrenchment should first be used.

If those who live upon the treasury had work enough to do in their own departments, they would not have time for conspiracies and for agitating the mob in public places.

Gratuities and presents are incompatible with the circumstances of the treasury.

The right road to take in taxation is this.

The taxes will admit of being augmented in many parts of the kingdom, which visibly do not pay what they ought to pay to the State.

But a year ago, when, in the latest administrative reform, the preservation of different districts and councils of the kingdom was under discussion, there was not one district threatened that did not immediately come forward armed with statistical documents to prove that it was richer than its neighbour.

Between the districts of Braga and that of Vianna the competition was quite edifying.



Braga (H) had its traditions, its archbishop, its cathedral, its aristocracy, its agriculture, its religious pre-eminence, its looms and manufactories,—everything that could be required to constitute an important centre of provincial civilization.

In Vianna there was the importation and the exportation; the fishery in the Minho, described as another Pactolus; a land of richness and fertility so great that it deserved to be an independent kingdom.

Within the councils themselves it was the same, and in the parishes the struggle was more curious still; it was a downright parochial regatta.

Each seat in the parochial council was disputed like the throne of Macedonia, by the very persons who afterwards assailed the law of civil administration with abuse; while for the place of magistrate of a civil parish, both for the honour it would confer, and the no small profit, those who clamoured most loudly for economy fought with more heat and passion than if it had been the Monthyon prize.<sup>(1)</sup>

But there comes a whisper of taxation, and straightway all these riches are turned into poverty, registers burnt, collectors persecuted, offices pillaged; and all the cheats and sharpers lighting their torches to make an *auto-da-fé* of the documents that subjected them to the operation of the law of the land.

Against those who receive what they ought not to receive, and those who do not pay what they ought to pay, let the Government put the laws into execution; that is all.

External safety, internal order, and the national credit, depend in the first instance upon these simple measures. Either enforce them or retire.

The picture is a sad one, yet it is but too near the truth; if, indeed, it be not the very truth.

#### IV.

Two terrible spectres, then, are assuming shape in our horizon.

Political ruin.

Financial ruin.

It is beneath these two threats that the Government, be it what it may, will have to direct the yet living forces of the nation.

If the people must be called upon for self-devotion and patriotism, it is only by the exercise of the most perfect good faith and the greatest energy that the government can, in the interests of liberty, save us from the consequences of all the timid compromises, all the political artifices, all the financial expedients, all the economical errors, all the public and private jobbery, which have deluded the country, sophisticated its institutions, altered the dogmas and relaxed the discipline of the generous but too credulous Liberal party.

In the first place, how is it possible for us to possess the respect of other nations while we find ourselves in such a position that we cannot defend our own frontiers?

In the second, how can we expect to obtain the confidence of foreign capitalists while we give no such proof of our resources as would at once disarm the imputations raised against our good faith by the press, in the cause of a Railway Company which notoriously has failed in performing its own engagements towards us?

To show that we are capable of maintaining our political credit, and of surmounting our financial difficulties by our own resources, is the first duty of Government, and perhaps its only duty.

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If this little pamphlet had been intended to explain the doctrine of a party, or that of a political clique, the points on which it does but touch would have been more thoroughly developed.

But it was not so intended.

It is but the expression of my own thought; no more.

I cannot comprehend the utility of artificial cliques for the fabrication of Cabinets; but every day I have more faith in the power of natural parties to organize governments in harmony with their own principles.

But these parties exist, not because they retain within them certain individuals, but because they follow certain ideas, and hold up to the light of day certain definite doctrines.

It was to heal the canker and the weakness of the Liberal party, by uniting the two groups, *Pro-gressista* and *Regenerador*, into which it was divided, that the coalition was proposed and realised three years ago.

Even yet I am proud to have signed that compact, which, while it appeared to triumph, every one claimed the glory of having initiated, and of which every one rejects the responsibility now that it is utterly broken and dissolved.

In political parties, as in religions, faith is indis-

pensable ; and living faith may bind men to an idea, but never subordinate them to an individual.

In artificial cliques, the infallibility of the chief is strong enough to subordinate the followers who live and grow under the shade of his power ; but in natural parties this is impossible, because the immortality of an universal idea cannot be imprisoned within the limits of a coterie.

The Liberal party has definite dogmas, which, by the pliability of statesmanship, may be eluded for the interests of the moment ; but it is this laxity which, doubling the strictness of the more earnest, gives birth to schism and to corruption of principle, of which they afterwards mutually accuse each other.

Liberal governments ought to be watchful guardians of the dogmas of the party they represent, as priests are of religion.

When they hesitate and doubt, they must not be surprised if they find themselves abandoned and isolated like the leper, or swallowed up like Abiram.

To govern is not to turn flexibly at the will of the wind, nor to use the days of a sterile existence for the convenience and pleasure of partisans.

Neither is to govern to resist, as some casuists pretend.

To govern by appealing to passions, and by the favour of the adverse party, is to enthrone anarchy and corruption.

To govern by obstinate resistance is the immobility by which M. Guizot transferred from sovereignty to exile one of the most enlightened kings that France ever had.

To govern is to call forth, to direct, and turn to

account all the activity and resources of a nation, according to the principles of the political and economical school to which the Ministry belongs, and that without reference to the day which must summon it to resign.

He who, from motives of personal ambition and vanity, enters a Cabinet with the idea of trimming among all the blunders and defects, both of his own followers and of the Opposition, will deservedly disappear like a shadow between the ridicule of his rise and the ridicule of his fall.

But he who, upheld by a noble purpose, enters a Cabinet to maintain the principles of the great Liberal party will have indeed to encounter the attacks of the Opposition, will have to live in an anxious and incessant warfare; but when he falls, it will be to rise again, like Antæus, with fresh power and energy: for Liberty, no less than Earth, renews within her bosom the strength that her sons have lost in the battle of the giants which she calls them to sustain.

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## N O T E S.

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### A. (Page 5.)

The Portuguese usually speak of D. Pedro IV. as the *Emperor*. He was proclaimed Emperor of Brazil during the lifetime of his father, D. João VI., by whom the independence of Brazil was recognized in 1825. In the same year D. João VI. died, and D. Pedro IV. succeeded to the throne of Portugal. Two months later he abdicated in favour of his daughter, D. Maria II., then about seven years old, whom he betrothed to his brother, D. Miguel; but D. Miguel refused to marry his niece, and, in 1828, usurped the crown of Portugal. In 1831 the Emperor abdicated the throne of Brazil in favour of his son, then a child, and in 1832 landed in Oporto, and ultimately succeeded in asserting the title of his daughter to the throne of Portugal.

### B. (Page 5.)

In the same year (1832), by an act of dictatorship, Monzinho da Silveira, the Emperor's minister, abolished, in the name of D. Maria II., the government tithe levied upon all agricultural produce; the *commendas*, another old feudal tax, levied upon certain estates, and due originally to the crown, but which had, in most cases, been ceded to associations or to individuals; and the *direitos banaes*, or rights of toll on certain roads and bridges, likewise mostly held by private persons, or by convents and other corporations. These changes came into operation on the final overthrow and expulsion of D. Miguel, in 1833.



## C. (Page 9.)

On the 14th of August, 1385, there was a great battle at Aljubarrota, between the Portuguese, commanded by Dom João I., who had before been the Master of Aviz, and the Castilians, whose king, D. Juan I. of Castile, was a claimant for the crown of Portugal. It was as a thank-offering for the victory that the Portuguese gained that the beautiful church and monastery of Batalha were founded, by order of their king, who lies buried there. Old tales relate that in this battle a baker's wife, of Aljubarrota, by name Anna Brites, armed with her wooden shovel (or *peel*, as it is termed in England), slew a great number of Spaniards, in proof of which the memorable shovel is still preserved in the sacristy of Batalha.

## D. (Page 9.)

Montes-Claros is a small village in Estremadura, where, in June, 1667, the Portuguese army, commanded by the Marquis of Marialva, obtained a victory over the Spanish army, led by General Caracena.

## E. (Page 9.)

The order of Aviz is the highest military order of Portugal.

## F. (Page 10.)

D. Alfonso Henriques was the founder, in 1139, of the independence of Portugal, and the first *king of the Portuguese*, for such was the proper form, then quite unusual, of the title he assumed. The passage refers to the flight to Brazil, in 1807, of the Queen, D. Maria I., then mad, and of her son the Prince Regent, afterwards D. João VI.

## G. (Page 10.)

The transaction here alluded to, which occurred in the Tagus, in 1858, excited much indignation in Portugal, and a long discussion in both houses of the English Parliament. The circumstances, as described on 8th March, 1859, by Mr.



Kinglake in the House of Commons, and, on the same day by Lord Wodehouse in the House of Lords, were as follows: A French vessel, called the *Charles et Georges*, having an imperial delegate on board, had been freighted by the French Government for the purpose of obtaining Negro workmen from the Mozambique coast, where there is a Portuguese settlement, and carrying them to be employed as labourers in the French Island of Bourbon, or Réunion. The vessel first arrived in Conducia Bay, Mozambique, in November, 1857. Negroes were taken on board, some of them with their hands tied, as if contrary to their own will. The vessel was thereupon denounced by the British Consul, seized by the Portuguese authorities, and condemned by a Portuguese commission. In August, 1858, the vessel was brought into the Tagus by a prize crew; her release was immediately and peremptorily demanded by the French minister at Lisbon, on the ground that the presence of the imperial delegate was evidence of the legality of the business in which she was engaged, and therefore that there was no warrant for seizing her. The Portuguese Government, appealing to certain treaties, and to the close relations of the two countries for more than two hundred years, applied for the advice and assistance of the British Government; several communications and suggestions followed, which led to no diplomatic result. In October, two French ships of war were sent to the Tagus, and, in the presence of superior force, the Portuguese Government had no alternative but to surrender the *Charles et Georges*, paying a fine for her detention; and that vessel, accompanied by the two ships of war, sailed from Lisbon on 26th October, 1858. The attempted charge in the Houses of Parliament, of the party in opposition, against the Ministry, failed on the ground, first, that a *casus fœderis* had not arisen, and next, that there was some doubt if the act of seizure had not taken place beyond the conventional distance of three miles from shore, when the ship was not in Portuguese waters; or, if she was, had been driven there by a Portuguese sloop of war.

## H. (Page 26.)

Braga. There are in Portugal three great centres of ultramontaniam, viz:—

Torres Vedras, where there are already a convent of Jesuits in Barro, and one of Franciscans in Varatojo, two small villages close to Torres.

Covilhan, where also there are convents of Jesuits.

And Braga, where everything is Jesuitical and fanatical.

There is great reason to believe that the money which lately appeared in the provincial popular agitations, and in the tumults in Lisbon, and that which was found in the hands of the chief of a revolutionary association in Lisbon, was supplied by these fanatical agents of Spain and Rome, to be used against the Liberals.

## I. (Page 26.)

Monthyon Prize, an expression frequently used in Portugal to denote anything uncommonly well worth having. These prizes, which are in the gift of the Académie Française and the Académie des Sciences, were founded in 1782, by the Baron de Monthyon, who devoted the greater part of his large fortune to that purpose.





